fter the American Revolution, American

merchants lost the protection the British

navy gave to their ships on the seas. In 1785, the

loss of that protection took on real meaning when

the Ottoman regency of Algiers captured two

American merchant vessels and took their crews

into captivity. Over the next decade, American

diplomats tried to establish treaties with the four

Barbary states (Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and

Tripoli) so that no more American ships would

be captured, though around a dozen more were

captured in the intervening time. In the late 1790s,

all four states agreed to treaties with the United

States, but the demands in those treaties were a

steep price for the United States to pay.

The Barbary states had been operating a protection

racket in the Mediterranean for hundreds of years;

in exchange for leaving a nation’s ships alone, the

Barbary rulers insisted on being paid money and

gifts, sometimes at regular intervals but more often

upon the slightest pretext. The United States had

neither the resources nor the patience to keep up

this system indefinitely. Beginning in 1794, the

federal government made halfhearted preparations

to send a naval force to the Mediterranean to take

care of the problem by force, but undeclared war

with France between 1798 and 1800 got in the way.

When the navy finally left for the Mediterranean in

1801, Tripoli had already declared war.


When the first squadron arrived in the

Mediterranean in July 1801, the United States

was no longer at peace. On May 14, 1801, Yusuf

Karamanli had ordered the flagpole cut down at

the American consulate in Tripoli, a signal that he

had declared war. In response, on July 23, William

Eaton, American consul at Tunis, announced in a

circular that Tripoli was officially under blockade,

anticipating Commodore Dale’s probable strategy.

In principle, Dale agreed with Eaton’s actions,

writing to the Secretary of the Navy, “Should the

United States Determin to carry on the War against

Tripoli it will be highly necessary to keep it closly


When the squadron arrived in July, the commodore,

Richard Dale, was surprised to learn that war had

been declared. That change meant the plans that

had been laid had to change. Given the difficulties

of the task, it is not surprising that during Dale’s

command no decisive action occurred. For this first

cruise, there was little that could be done aside from

cruise off Tripoli and convoy merchants from one

end of the Mediterranean to the other. With only

three frigates and a schooner in the squadron, each

ship had more than enough to keep it busy.






Once all the ships were assigned to a task, only

one frigate was left to actually do the blockade of

Tripoli. The President was meant to maintain the

blockade along with the Enterprize. As it turned

out, between sickness, bad weather, and ship repairs,

the President spent almost no time before Tripoli.

The one action of any consequence during the first

squadron’s cruise was accomplished not by one of

the frigates, but by the schooner Enterprize on its

way to Malta to get water for the President.

The encounter between the Enterprize, captained

by Andrew Sterett, and the 14-gun, 80-man Tripoli

was a promising start for the American squadron.

On August 1, 1801, while flying British colors, the

Enterprize sighted a ship. When Sterett asked what

the ship was doing, its commander replied that

it was out “to cruise after the Americans.” Upon

hearing this reply, Sterett hauled down the British

colors, which he had been sailing under in order

to deceive any potential threats, and raised the

American flag, firing muskets into the Tripoli. The

Tripoli fired a partial broadside in return.

The fight lasted about three hours, during which

time the Tripolitans attempted to board the

Enterprize three times. Each time the crew and

marines repulsed them. The Tripoli’s captain

also tried a strategy that most sailors considered

dishonorable: striking his colors and then resuming

the fight. The third time the Tripoli struck, Sterett

disregarded the surrender and ordered the vessel

to be sunk. Eventually the Tripoli’s crew “cried for

mercy,” and Sterett ordered their officers to come

on board the Enterprize. He refused to board the

Tripoli with his own officers, lest this cry for mercy

be yet another trick.

After lying about the destruction of their boat, the

Tripolitans eventually came over to the Enterprize

and revealed the extent of the devastation Sterett

and his crew had wreaked. Twenty of the eighty

crewmen had been killed, with another thirty

wounded. The captain and first lieutenant had

been wounded, and the second lieutenant and

surgeon killed. The Tripoli itself suffered so much

damage that it was almost unable to be sailed,

“having received 18 shot between wind and water.”

By contrast, the Enterprize had suffered almost

no structural damage and none of the crew were

injured at all.

Because Sterett’s orders did not permit him to take

an enemy ship as prize, he had to let the Tripoli go,

but not before he cut down its masts and threw all

its guns overboard. In practical terms, this victory

meant little, but it purportedly demoralized the

Tripolitans so much that all the sailors who were

to man other corsair vessels deserted them instead.

On the American side, it helped to throw popular

opinion behind the use of force against the Barbary



Capitalizing on the Enterprize’s victory proved

impossible. The difficulty of maintaining peace with

the other Barbary states, and maintaining a very

small squadron far from supplies and manpower,

proved barriers too high to overcome.

As winter fell, the American squadron gave up even

the pretense of blockade. Sailors’ enlistments were


coming to an end, and the squadron’s ships one

by one were ordered home. The war with Tripoli

was in stalemate, relations with the other Barbary

states were fragile but holding, and despite the

Enterprize’s victory, the Americans had generally

demonstrated that they were only a lesser power in

the Mediterranean community.


The first few months of 1802 saw little activity from

Dale or his squadron. Hamstrung by ineffectual

orders and serious repairs to his ship, Dale spent

the winter of 1801-1802 in Toulon. Dale himself

prepared to head back to the United States, as his

term as commodore was up. The Secretary of the

Navy prepared to send a new squadron in order to

arrive in time to re-engage with Tripoli once the

winter weather cleared.

However, back in the United States there were

delays in forming the new squadron. When

Dale and the President returned home, the next

commodore had not yet even left the United States.

At least there was a new commodore, though:

Richard Valentine Morris.

With his confidence in the navy’s skill waning,

William Eaton, erstwhile consul at Tunis, began

to take matters into his own hands. He and James

Leander Cathcart, the displaced consul at Tripoli,

came up with a plan to reinstate Hamet Karamanli,

the older brother of the reigning bashaw, Yusuf

Karamanli. Yusuf had deposed Hamet some years

previous, and Hamet had fled to Egypt. Now Eaton

and Cathcart wanted to bring him back.

When Richard Valentine Morris finally arrived in

the Mediterranean, he found that relations with

Morocco were at a breaking point. Several tense

weeks resulted, though consul James Simpson at

Tangier was able to finally talk the Moroccan sultan

into a fragile peace.

In June 1802, an American vessel, the Franklin

was captured by a Tripolitan cruiser. The crew

of the vessel was sent to Algiers, where the

Americans had to rely on the good graces of the

British consul in Algiers and the Danish consul in

Tripoli, Nicholas Nissen. Eventually Algiers took

a hand in redeeming the captives, an outcome

that only weakened the American position in the


Since Richard Valentine Morris seemed disinclined

to act against any of the Barbary powers with force,

other captains in the squadron stepped up. Morris

spent almost no time on the blockade of Tripoli.

The two who took the lead most frequently were

also the most irascible: Alexander Murray and

Daniel McNeill. Murray and McNeill made no

secret of their disdain for procedure or for their


As the year 1802 came to a close, relations with

both enemies and allies were more fragile than ever

before. Morris’s apathy did not go unnoticed. In

1803, the commodore was ordered home to face a

court-martial for dereliction of duty.


1803 was a year of considerable diplomatic turmoil


in the other Barbary states as well as Tripoli.

From the very beginning of the year, Commodore

Morris could not keep up a show of strength in

relations with Algiers and Tunis, capitulating to

their demands or putting them off as best he could.

Consul James Simpson believed that Morocco

was colluding with Tripoli to break the American

blockade, and subsequent events gave rather more

credence to that belief.

After an abortive attempt to negotiate with Tripoli,

Morris returned to Malta (where his wife and new

baby were residing). He would not leave Malta

again for any significant length of time during

his tenure. Meanwhile, James Simpson tried

desperately to keep the peace in Morocco.

Commodore Morris’s replacement, Edward Preble,

arrived in Gibraltar on September 13, one day after

Morris received his recall papers from one of the

advance ships in Preble’s squadron. Morris returned

home to face a court-martial for his apathetic

leadership, while Preble had to begin to try to patch

things back together. His first task was to deal with

the Morocco problem. It was increasingly clear that

Morocco was helping Tripoli, and Preble had to

find a way to stop it. It took Preble nearly a month

to restore peace with the emperor.



On October 31, the focus of the war suddenly

shifted from Morocco to Tripoli. While cruising off

Tripoli, the Philadelphia had sighted a Tripolitan

vessel. Pursuing the vessel into Tripoli harbor,

the frigate had run aground four or five miles

east of the town. Despite cutting away anchors,

guns, and even the foremast, the crew could not

lift the Philadelphia off the bar. Four hours of

fire from Tripolitan gunboats and shore batteries

convinced Captain William Bainbridge that he

could not hope to defeat them. Around sunset, the

Philadelphia struck its colors and the ship’s crew

were taken prisoner.

Though several European nations rallied to the

aid of the American prisoners, there was little

Commodore Preble could do. Without diplomatic

representation in the Tripolitan court, he had to

rely on the generosity of others, particularly the

Danish consul Nicholas Nissen, to provide for

the captives. Any retaliatory action would have to

wait until spring when the weather improved. As

the year ended, Preble did get some good news:

the Enterprize and the Constitution had captured

a small Tripolitan ketch named the Mastico. They

renamed the ketch the Intrepid and began to make

plans for it.


Throughout the war, certain consuls became

convinced that a naval war was not going to end

the war on favorable terms for the United States. In

1804, William Eaton increased his work to find a

different solution: reinstate the deposed brother of

the reigning bashaw, and negotiate a more favorable

treaty with him.

Hamet, the deposed older brother of Yusuf

Karamanli, liked Eaton’s plan in principle, but

Eaton found Hamet extremely challenging to work


with. Reports were that Yusuf ’s hold on Tripoli

was loosening, so the time was ripe to bring Hamet

forward. But Hamet, despite requesting money and

supplies repeatedly, could not be convinced to begin

the journey toward Tripoli.

While Eaton worked with Hamet, Commodore

Preble re-evaluated the navy’s strategy. He

concluded that blockading was not sufficient, so

he began to make plans to also bombard the city

of Tripoli. But first he had to take care of the

Philadelphia problem.

On February 16, 1804, a handpicked group of men

under the command of Stephen Decatur took the

ketch Intrepid to Tripoli harbor, accompanied by

the Syren. The Intrepid slipped into the harbor

and up to the side of the Philadelphia. As quietly

and quickly as possible, the sailors boarded the

Philadelphia, set charges and then got off. The ship

burned to a hulk, so brightly that Syren’s crew, miles

away, could see the flames.

This action did little tactically or strategically, but

it improved morale tremendously for the American

sailors in the Mediterranean. But the next course

of action was simply to resume the blockade, a

task Preble intended to perform with much more

stringency than his predecessors. After preparations

for months, Preble was finally ready to take the full

squadron to Tripoli.

On August 3, the squadron engaged the Tripolitans

off the port of Tripoli. The Americans lost no ships

and only one officer, and they took many prisoners.

After the battle, Preble stayed off Tripoli for a

month waiting for the bashaw to communicate

with him. When nothing was forthcoming, Preble

decided to try yet another approach.

The Intrepid once again proved its worth, as

Preble ordered it converted into a fireship, which

Lt. Richard Somers volunteered to pilot into the

harbor and then detonate near the Tripolitan ships.

The next day, after loading the Intrepid with the

explosives, Somers and a small crew began to sail

the ketch into the harbor. The crew was supposed

to light a small fire to distract any Tripolitans who

might try to stop them, but instead, as the Intrepid

reached its destination, the entire ship blew up

prematurely while the crew was still on board.

The entire crew was killed, including Midshipman

Henry Wadsworth, who had been in the

Mediterranean longer than almost any other officer.

Shortly after the Intrepid disaster, Commodore

Preble had to return home. Though the loss of the

ship had been a morale blow, Preble had at least

ratcheted up the pressure on Tripoli. His successor

would have to try to capitalize on some of that



The new commodore who arrived at the end of

1804 was in no condition to capitalize on Edward

Preble’s success. The commodore, Samuel Barron,

was so sick he could barely sail, and the American

ships were scattered throughout the Mediterranean

to make much-needed repairs and find supplies.

Though Barron would not be on board, he ordered

the President, the Constitution, and the Constellation

off Tripoli for a cruise. The Nautilus was to cruise


off Tunis after a quick convoy trip. The Essex was

ordered to Venice, where Captain James Barron was

to try to acquire gunboats from the government

there. Commodore Barron was not sanguine about

Captain Barron’s chances, but since Naples had not

worked out, he felt he had no choice. While the

Essex, Constitution, and President prepared for the

cruise in Malta, they were met by the Nautilus, who

brought in a Tripolitan brig.

Captain John Rodgers felt that the time was

quickly approaching to strike the death blow to

the Tripolitans. Tripoli’s fleet of gunboats had not

increased since the winter, and Rodgers wanted

to strike before the circumstances changed. But

other than infrequent chases, the squadron saw

little activity in their cruise before Tripoli. The

real action was happening nearly 600 miles away,

where William Eaton and a ragtag band of warriors

prepared for an assault on Derna.



On December 1, 1804, William Eaton and a small

American force of marines arrived in Rosetta,

Egypt, preparing to find Hamet. Successfully

navigating the political landscape in Egypt proved

complicated for Eaton, but eventually he was able

to find Hamet and rendezvous with him outside

Alexandria on February 5. It wasn’t until February

23 that the two came to an agreement about the

plan for the coup and the promised results.

On March 4, Hamet and Eaton’s company, now

numbering about 400 since some local warriors

had joined them, began the march across the desert

to Derna in Tripoli. Derna wasn’t the capital of

Tripoli, but Eaton hoped a victory at Derna would

put enough pressure on Yusuf to turn the tide.

As they marched, the numbers of men waxed and

waned, as various group became disgruntled and

left, or heard about the coup and wanted to join.

After meeting up with the Argus on April 16, the

men were resupplied and began to plan the attack

on Derna.

Eaton’s forces started the attack on Derna around

2:00pm on April 26. By 4:00pm, they had taken

the fort. It was a significant victory for a largely

unorganized and uncooperative group. However,

once Eaton’s company took Derna, their momentum

disintegrated. Eaton realized now that Hamet could

not be trusted to continue the campaign on his

own, so he felt obliged to stay and see the operation

through. The navy felt no such compunction. Barron

and Lear had concluded that Hamet Karamanli

now should be left to his own fate, and the newly

appointed Commodore John Rodgers agreed.


Even before the news of Derna’s fall came, Yusuf

Karamanli was putting out feelers for peace. On

May 29, he sent a messenger to negotiator Tobias

Lear with an opening offer. On June 10, the peace

treaty was officially drawn up. After meeting with

the bashaw on June 20, Commodore Rodgers

weighed anchor from Tripoli on June 21 along with

Colonel Lear. Peace with Tripoli had been restored.

—Dr. Abby Mullen


he Shores of Tripoli is my first game design.

I never expected to be a game designer,

but in 2016 I received a copy of Thomas Jefferson

and the Tripoli Pirates (by Brian Kilmeade and

Don Yaeger) and became fascinated by the First

Barbary War. I was shocked that there was not a

game on this episode of Early American history.

I did a little more research and realized that this

topic would make an excellent game.

The Shores of Tripoli was destined to be a card-

driven game. From the classic We the People,

to heavier titles like Sword of Rome and Here I

Stand, to two of my all-time favorites, Twilight

Struggle and 1960: The Making of the President, I

have been enamored with how card-driven games

can convey so much history and yet be so fun to

play. I knew that I wanted The Shores of Tripoli to

be educational—that after two or three plays, a

player would have a good grasp of not only the

history but the choices and challenges for both

the United States and Tripolitania. The best way

to do that was with small individual decks for

each nation—unlike in a game with a shared

deck, where a side may not see some of its most

interesting cards, with individual decks each

player will see their best cards and the crunch is

when and how to best use those cards.

The victory conditions for the United States were

easy to determine. After three years of frustration,

the United States stepped up its blockade and

hatched a plan to replace Yusuf Qaramanli, the

Tripolitan bashaw, with his pro-American brother

Hamet Qaramanli. The pressure convinced Yusuf

to sign a treaty favorable to the United States.

Thus, the Treaty of Peace and Amity and Assault

on Tripoli cards. For Tripolitania, the goal was to

have the American price in blood or treasure too

high so the Americans would capitulate and start

paying tribute again. Thus, the winning conditions

for Tripolitania. With only a maximum of

twenty-four turns, the tension in Tripoli comes

from each side having too much to do and not

enough time to do it. I am very pleased with

the excitement near the end of the game, when

Tripolitania is racing to get its twelfth gold or

sink the fourth American frigate before the U.S.

can play its Treaty card or its Assault card.

In designing the game, I wanted to emphasize

that Tripolitania was a rational actor and that

the First Barbary War was not “the first war on

terror.” It was a state versus state conflict like

so many others of that time. There were some

key episodes in the war that I knew I wanted to

communicate. The initial arrival of the American

fleet into Gibraltar with the Americans not

knowing if they were at war or peace, the rather

dismal partnership with Sweden in blockading

Tripoli, the threat of entry into the war by Algiers,

Morocco and Tunis, the capture and subsequent

burning of the Philadelphia, and the capture of

Derne. I also wanted to make sure the key figures

made their appearance—Qaramanli and Reis for

Tripolitania and O’Bannon, Eaton, Sterett, Preble,

Decatur and Bainbridge for the United States.

I would have liked to have included a card for

Richard Somers, who died while commanding the

Intrepid, but the 27-card limit did not allow.





In addition to being educational, I also wanted the

game to be approachable. Nothing pleased me more

during in-person play testing than to see a couple

play against each other or a parent play with an

older child—and everyone having fun. I knew that

the game needed to play in an hour or less and have

simple mechanics. The presentation also needed to

be outstanding—hence, the solid wood pieces and

beautiful map and cards. But at the same time, the

game also needed complex decision-making and

solid replayability. The perfect blend of simplicity

and complexity is a difficult needle to thread, but I

hope we succeeded.

I did have to make some trade-offs between

historical accuracy and playability. For example,

the American fleet consisted of frigates, brigs

and schooners but I treat all the American

ships as frigates. The main Tripolitan fleet was

a hodgepodge of vessels that I standardized as

“corsairs.” Sweden had already declared war on

Tripoli in 1800 and exited the war in 1802, while

in the game the earliest they leave is 1803. I also

had to create some alternate history cards for the

potential assault on Tripoli. General Eaton Attacks

Benghazi, Assault on Tripoli, Marine Sharpshooters,

and Send in the Marines, as well as Constantinople

Sends Aid are all cards from that alternate history.

Similarly, the Algerine, Moroccan, and Tunisian

cards represent the threat that Tripoli’s allies posed

to the United States, but their allies did very little

during the actual war. Finally, to allow each player

a bit more freedom to explore their options and

strategies, the game can go until the end of 1806,

whereas the war itself ended in June of 1805.

Thank you so much for buying The Shores of Tripoli.

I am very grateful for the assistance provided by

the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command,

the Marine Corps History Division, the Mariners

Museum in Newport News and the U.S. Naval

Academy Museum. I am also extremely grateful

for the hundreds of play testers who took the time

and effort to take the print and play files and build

the game and provide amazing feedback. Finally, I

really appreciate all of the Kickstarter backers who

put their money and faith in our project. Thank you



In addition to Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli

Pirates, ABC Whipple’s To the Shores of Tripoli:

The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines and Joshua

London’s Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with

the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and

Shaped a Nation both provide good overviews of

the conflict. I am also a fan of Osprey Publishing’s

“Essential Histories” series and their The Wars of the

Barbary Pirates by Gregory Fremont-Barnes does

not disappoint.

For more in-depth reading, Chipp Reid’s pair of

books Intrepid Sailors: The Legacy of Preble’s Boys

and the Tripoli Campaign and To the Walls of Derne:

William Eaton, the Tripoli Coup, and the End of the

First Barbary War are both outstanding. Ian Toll’s

Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the

U.S. Navy is a masterpiece on the early history of

the U.S. Navy. Benjamin Armstrong’s Small Boats

and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular

Warfare, and the Early American Navy is an excellent

survey of maritime raids and irregular warfare

from the first fifty years of American naval history.

There are plenty of biographies to choose from but

the two I recommend are Edward Preble: A Naval

Biography 1761-1807 by Christopher McKee and

A Call to the Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS

Constitution by Claude Berube and John Rodgaard.

Finally, watch for Abby Mullen’s A Difficult

Undertaking: Conflict and Cooperation in the First

Barbary War, 1801-1805, coming in 2022.


If you are interested in podcasts, “Sea Control” by

the Center for International Maritime Security

(www.cimsec.org) and “Preble Hall” by the United

States Naval Academy Museum (www.usna.edu/

museum/) are both fantastic. “Sea Control” has

some excellent episodes on both naval history

and war gaming. “Preble Hall” has a number of

outstanding episodes, but my favorite is EP3:

The Tripoli War with Dr. Abby Mullen. The two-

episode special collaboration between “Sea Control”

and “Preble Hall” is also not to be missed.

—Kevin Bertram


Game Design and Development: Kevin Bertram

Art and Graphic Design: Cathy Bock, Marc

Rodrigue, Matthew Wallhead

Historical Essay: Abby Mullen, Ph.D.

Naval Advisor: Robert Bishop, USNA ‘64

Executive Producers: Bret Baier, Dan Fellhauer,

Jason Matthews, Ruben Rodriguez, Paige Terrill,

Austin Woodruff

Senior Playtesters: Alison Bishop, Katherine

Bishop, Janice Day, Jason Matthews, Trevor Reed

Playtesters: Martin Akerlund, Bill Allen,

Jonathan Allred, Elizabeth Anderson, Samantha

Anderson, Bob Arhaus, Nathan Arnold, Sandra

Atwater, Noah Ban, Mike Banks, Tom Barbe,

Giorgio Barbero, Andrew Baron, Roy Bartoo,

Doug Bass, Patrick Beben, Kevin Berent, Mark

Biggar, Corey Bishop, Chris Blackford, Marc

Blume, Kristof Bodric, Ray Bonilla, Arno Bomans,

Mik Bonsall, Jackson Boomhower, Steve Boone,

Keeley Bowers, Shawn Bowers, James Brennan,

Chris Brooks, Ryan Brown, Nikolaj Brucker, Neal

Bryan, Harold Buchanan, Gordon Burg, Scott

Burger, Deividas Burokas, Matthew Butler, Grant

Cadenhead, Thomas Cadenhead, Ty Cadenhead,

Randy Callard, James Campanella, Jerry Campbell,

Robert Carroll, Todd Carter, Simona Centola, Sean

Chick, Christine Chilcott, Ross Chilcott, David

Christians, Irwin Cohen, Forest Cole, Gabriel Cole,

John Coley, Michel Condoroussis, J.C. Connors,

Liam Connors, Grant Cooley, Sarah Cothran, Wes

Cothran, Andrew Lorenzo Cozzi, Aidan Curran,

Jason Covault, Patrick Crowley, John D’Alton,

Daniel Daley, John D’Alton, Justin Davis, Howard

Dawson, Charles Day, Joris Debien, Michael

Debije, Alexandra De La Cruz, Stefan DeMarchi,

Willis Dell, Paul DiCocco, Carl DiNardo, Lisa

DiNardo, Brian Dixon, Scott Dixon, David

Donahue, Kathleen Donahue, Paul Dobbins, Glenn

Drover, Herve B. Duval, Matthew Eckel, Charlotte

Edwards, Michael Edwards, Max Eisenblatter,

Fred Ellsesser, Alan Emrich, James Fardette, Ralph

Ferrari, Darryl Ferster, Jeff Finkleday, Maurice

Fitzgerald, Glenn Flaherty, Jared Frandson, Steve

Froud, Ray Garbee, Michael Germano, Robert

Germano, Danielle Giordano, James Griffith,

Hernando David Gomez, Nicolas Govin, Jack

Greene, Steve Guepet, Dan Gunther, Sandeep

Gupta, Lucy Guritza, Jack Guritza, John Guthrie,

Eric Hallstrom, Pavel Hammerschmidt, James

Hammes, Gabriel Hansberry, Nathan Hansen,

Brian Hard, Dodd Harris, Michael Harris, Jason

Hathaway, Christopher Haupt, Zachary Haupt,

Jan Heinemann, John Heinlein, Graham Henry,

Luis Hernandez, Tomas Hernell, Brian Herr,

Patrick Hildreth, Sebastian Hummel, Scott Huss,

Daniel Hernandez Iniesta, Theodor Isacsson, Jonas

Lidström Isegrim, Deb Jennings, Dan Johansson,

Nate Jones, Ron Jongeling, Jay Joyner, Yani

Kalafatis, Adam Kasztenny, Autumn Katerle, Jim

Katerle, Jacob Keith, Barry Kendall, Emmanuel

Kern, Darren Kerr, Mark Kidwell, Ian Kilgore,


Josh Kimble, Sarah Kimble, Chris King, Chad

Kirk, Tabletop Knights, Brandon Koida, Robby

Koreman, Petros Kranias, Brian Kumanchik,

Robert Kurcina, Harold Lajoie, Cherish Lallone,

Sam LaSala, Brian Laskowski, Laura Laskowski,

Javier Lastra, Hipszki Laszlo, Gerard Law, Arnaud

Leclerc, Derek Lenard, David Lent, Steve Leonard,

Joseph Light, Chad Lindsey, Brian Loomis, Paul

Loong, Gilberto Lopez, Thomas Loquvam, Phil

Low, Thomas Lupia, Mike Lyle, Philip Manoff,

Dan Mansfield, Tyrus Manuel, Johnny Mariani,

Matt Mayse, Eric Mazelis, Noah McHugh, Jake

McInnis, Mark McLaughlin, Leo McMahon,

Jordan McMullen, Adam Meledeo, Adrian Michot,

Ryan Michot, Stephen Michot, David Mickle,

Phillip Millman, Scott Miserendino, Marina

Mishnayevskaya, Dipti Mohanan, Peter Morris,

Chad Morrison, Travis Morton, Gray Moser,

Francesco Motta, Quinn Munnerlyn, Douglas

Murphy, Jeffrey Myers, Casey Nedry, James Neeley,

Lisa Nelson, Kyle Nichols, Marcel Nijenhof , John

Noblitt, John Norris, Michael O’Connell, Joseph

O’Donnell, Brian O’Farrell, Timo Ollikainen,

Marleen Overkamp, Mark Papenfuss, Greg Parker,

Rick Pasquale, Kim Paul, James Perrett, Matthew

Philipps, Garrett Potvin, Allan Prins, Loisyann

Prost, Steve Post, Ben Pulver, Joey Rawlins, Chipp

Reid, Michael Rensink, Michael Reste, John

Retzer, Andy Reynolds, Bryan Robison, Herman

Roozen, Morris Roozen, John Ross, Patrick Ross,

Jean-Sebastien Rozon, Ben Rubin, Volko Ruhnke,

Derrick Sanchez, Andrey Sanin, Hans Saunders,

Scott Savory, Aram Schvey, Russell Schwebke, John

Scott, Roger Secrest, Gary Selkirk, Ralph Severson,

Roseann Severson, Edwin Shaw, Alex Shelton, Ken

Shows, Fred Shugars, Zoli Simon, Nathan Smith,

Dylan Snyder, Ryan Snyder, Kyla Sommers, Erin

Sparks, David Sterling, Neil Stevens, Andy Stocker,

Mike Stoodley, Paul Stouthard, Stephen Stover,

Chris Strabala, Peter Svensson, Benjamin Suan,

Andrew Symons, Lenny Talbot, Shaun Taulbee,

Paige Terrill, Brian Thiel, David Thompson, Richard

Thompson, Brian Thorvilson, Mark Tkac, Doshu

Tokeshi, Lars Toft, Eric Topp, Joel Toppen, Juanmi

Espejo Torres, Attilio Tribuzi, Ransom Trimble,

Ivan Trupkovic, Larry Underwood, Carl van Dam,

Rachel van Dam, Guy van Dille, Mike van Doorn,

Adam van Langenberg, Rob van Wijngaarden,

Antonio Vaquera, Charles Vasey, Tom Volpe,

Nathan Wagner, Aaron Walker, Evan Walter, Eri

Walters, Rich Ware, Mason Weaver, Jonathan

Webb, Michael Webb, Jonathan Weidow, Paul S.

Weintraub, Andrew Wells, Patrick Wells, Philip

Wheeler, Chris Whitaker, Brian White, Michael

White, Charles Wicklund, Nathan Wilson,

Mick Wood, Joel Wrigley, Kevin Youells, Steven


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